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88TI-I CONGRESS SENATE REPORT
2d Session No. 1017
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENI)MENTS
ArnIL 30 (legislative day, MARCH 30), 1964.-Ordered to he printed
Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following
REPORT
together with
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[Pursunnt to S. Res. 57, 88th Cong., Ist sess., as extended]
Senate Resolution 57, agreed to March 14, 1963, authorized theCommittee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommitteethereof, to examine, investigate, and make a complete study of any
nndl all matters pertaining to constitutional amendments under sections134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 as
amended, and in accordance with its jurisdictions specified by ruleXXV
of the Standing Rules of the Senate. Pursuant to section 3 of said
resolution, the Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
of the Committee on the Judiciary reports its actions and findings
and recommendations as follows:
SUMMARY
During the 1st session of the 88th Congress, 29 joint resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments were introduced in the Senate.
Appended to this report is a tabulation of these proposals by number,
sponsor, and subject matter, showing the action taken on each of them.
During the month of June 1963, the Subcommittee on Constitu-tional Amendmensts held hearings on 10 resolutions to amend theConstitution. These hearings related to various aspects of the
nomination and election of President and Vice President and presi-dential inability. Seven of the resolutions concern the nomination
and election of President and Vice President. This hearing was held
on June 4, 1963, which was supplemental to hearings held on May 23,30; June 8, 27, 28, 29, and July 13, 1961-87th Congress, 1st session.
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Three of the resolutions concern presidential inability. Hearings
were held on these resolutions on June 11 and 18, 1963. Both sets of
hearings have been printed.
Thus, two volumes of hearings have been printed, with a cumulative
total of 261 printed pages. Numerous witnesses as Senators, Repre-
sentatives, governmental officers, professors of political science, and
constitutional attorneys were heard. In addition, the record contains
the views of nationally known experts throughout the country.
Five resolutions have been reported by tile subcommittee to thefull committee. Two of them (S.J. Res. 12 and S.J. Res. 27) were
reported without recommendation. The remainder of these resolu-
tions (S.J. Res. 35, S.J. Res. 36, and S.J. Res. 37) were reportedfavorably with written reports. The remaining resolutions werepending in the subcommittee when the 1st session of the 88th Congress
ended.
A discussion of the principal areas of the subcommittee's activities,divided according to subject matter, follows:
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Senate Joint Resolution 35, introduced by Messrs. Kefauver and
Keating, and later sponsored by Mr. Dodd, was referred by the com-
mittee to the subcommittee on February 18, 1963. After the publichearing of June 11, 1963 (which encompassed the subject matter ofS.J. Res. 28 a related resolution), the resolution with amendments
was reported favorably to tlhe full committee on June 25, 1963.
The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 35, as reported by the
sulbcommnittee, is to authorize clearly the Vice President to exercise
the powers and duties of tle office of President at such times as the
President is unable to perform such powers and duties, and to give
the Congres3 tlle authority to enact legislation prescribing tle methodby which the commencement and the termination of any inability
shall be determined.
ST''AT'EME N'T
TIthe, in ability clause, a(nd its ite'rpretation
The' Consttitution of tlle United Stxtes, in article [I, section 1,
clause 6, contains l)l'ovisiols Irelating, to the continuity of Ilie executive
power Iat times of ldeatl, resignation, ilnalility, or reinoval of a Presi-dent. 'This clause relads asl follows:
In Case of tle Removal of the President from Office, or
of his l)eath, Resignation, or Inablility to disc1lar:ge the
Powers and l)uties of the said Office, the Slame s11all devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress ma y y law
provide for the Case of Remloval, I)eath, Resignation or
Ininbility, 1)othlof the President an(l Vice President, declaring
what (Oficer slall nct accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a Iresidlent, sliall be elected.
Tlls is tlle laIlnguage of the Constitution as it was adopted by theConstitutional l Conllenltion upon recominlendaltionl of tilc Committee
on1 Style. When this portion of the Constttiution was submitted to
thilit (olIllnittee it read ass follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,detitl, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
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powers or duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise
those powers and duties until another President be chosen,
or until the inability of the President be removed.
'The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the Presidenta,and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disabilitybe removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear
that this portion of the draft which that committee ultimately sub-
mitted was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the Com-
mittee had received. The records of the Constitutional Convention
do not contain any explicit interpretation of the provisions as they
relate to inability. As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention
contain only one apparent reference to the aspects of this clause whichdeal with the question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of
Delaware, who, on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is tobe the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427).
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Conventiondisclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison (lied, and Vice Presi-(ldlt John Tyler faced tile determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constritution, ho must serve as Acting Presi(dent or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice Presi-
dent Tyler gave answer by' taking the oath as President of the UnitedStates. Whilo this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that
of Senator William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later
recognized by the Congress as President of the United States by )both
HouIses of Congress (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol.10, pp. 3-5, May 31 to June 1, 1841).l'lls precedent of John Tyler has since l)een confirmed on 7 occa-
sions when Vice Presidents lIave succeeded to tlh Presidency of theUnited States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.Vice Presidents Fillnore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,Coolidge, Truman, and Johnson all became President initially in this
m acts of tes Vie osion, t in, or conTlhe acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or con-
firlnation of, their acts by Congress have rferved to establish a prece-dent that, in one of the contingencies under article IT, section 1, clause(, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the UnitedStates.
iThe clause which provides for succession in case of death also appliesto succession in case of resignation, removal from office, or inability.In all four contingencies, thle Corstitution states: "the same shalldevolve on the Vice President." Thus it is said thhatwatever devolves
upon the Vice President upon death of the President, likewise devolves
upon him by reason of the resignation, inability, or removal from officeof the President (Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, NorthAmerican Review, ' vol. 133, p. 442 (1881)).
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The Tyler precedent, therefore has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power andduties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent
on the return of the office or its functions to the President upon re-
covery. Where both the President and Vice President are incapable
of serving, the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare
what officer shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as Presi-dent, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency.
This interpretation gains support by implication from the language
of article I, section 3, clause 5, of the Constitution which provides
that the Senate shall choose a President pro tempore-
In the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall
exercise the office of President of the United States. [Italic
supplied.]
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed, mate-
rially to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President
at a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an P.ssassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during whichho performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of
a Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required atten-
tion. There were vidences of mail frauds involving officials of the
Federal Government. 'Yet only such business as could bo disposed
of by the heads of Government departments, without Presidential
supervision, was handled. Vice President Arthur did, not act. Re-
spected legal opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the
President to resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See
opinions of Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler,
and Prof. Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American
Review," vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the ad-
visability of the Vice President acting during the period of the Presi-dent's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were said tobe of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution of
Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly in-
cluded the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it wouldbe desirable for the Vice President to act, but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon re-
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covery, and because the President's condition prevented them frompresenting the issue to him directly, the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became of pressing urgency again. Thisdamage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shan-
tung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent 4
months in Washington without being received by the President.Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's wife
and a group of White House associates acted as a screening board ondecisions which could be submitted to the President without impair-
ment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs," pp.288-290; Hoover, "Forty-Two Years in the White House," pp. 105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was consider-
able opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of as-
sistants of the President. It has been reported by a presidential
secretary of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for
suggesting such a possibility (Joseph P. T'umulty, "Woodrow Wilson
as I Know Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate re-
covery the President caused the displacement of the Secretary ofState for reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty,
"Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidentsinvolving the physical health of the President served to focus atten-tion on the inability clause. President Eisenhower became concerned
about the gap in the Constitution relative to presidential inability,
and he attempted to reduce the hazards by means of an informal
agreement with Vice President Nixon. The agreement provided:1, In the event of inability the President would-if possible--
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exorcisinlg the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the Presi-dent from so communicating with' the Vice President, the VicePresident, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate
under the circumstances, would decide upon the cdevolution of
tle powers and duties of the office and would serve as ActingPresident until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when theinability had ended .and at that time would resume the full ex-
ercise of the powers and duties of the office.President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with VicePresident Johnson. Such informal agreements cannot be considered an
adequate solution to the problem because (a) their operation Woilddiffer according to the relationship between the particular holders ofthe offices; (b) an agreement cannot give the Vice President clear
authority to discharge powers conferred on the President by theConstitution, treaties, or statutes; (c) no provision'is niade for'the
situation in which a dispute exists over whether or not the President
S. Rept. 1017, 88-2---2
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is disabled. Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well
as Attorney General Kennedy agree that the only definitive method
to settle the problem is by means of a constitutional amendment.
TIHE NEED FOR CHANGE
The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 6, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented. Thelanguage of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency which
may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination
of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define inability so
that the existence of such a status may be open and notorious. Itleaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during
a period of inability of the President. It fails to limit the periodduring which the Vice President serves. It does not specify that a
recovered President may regain the prerogatives of his office if he has
relinquished then. It fails to provide any mechanism for determining
whether a President has in fact recovered from his inability, nor doesit indicate how a President, who sought to recover his prerogatives
while still disabled, might bo prevented from doing so. It also leaves
unclear the extent of the authority of Congress to act.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of executive
power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times when
a President is disabled. The importance of an executive power
capable of being exercised without appreciable interruption is greater
today than ever before. 'lThe concern which was manifested on pre-
vious occasions when a President was disabled, is increased when the
problem is weighed in the light of the increased importance of the
office of the Presidency of the United States and to the world.
The growth, not only in the power and prestige of the office of thePresiloncy, but also in the demands which it makes upon the occupant
of tle office, imposes increased concern as to the health of the Presi-(lent and the exercise of the powers and duties of his office when hishealth will not permit him to continue their exercise, either tempo-
rarily or permanently. This increased concern has in turn manifested
an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating
to the orderly transfer of the functions of the Presidency. Such an
examination is not reassuring. The constitutional provision has notbeen utilized because its procedures have not been clear. After 175
years of experience with the Constitution the inability clause remains
an untested provision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE
In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of tle major considerations has been whether Congress could con-
stitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives, 66th Congress, 2d session considered the problem, Repre-
sentatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position that
the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without an
amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess was
6
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of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under theConstitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased il intensity mnong Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the Presidential inabilityproblems.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. Theypoint out that article II, section 1, clause 6, of the Constitution au-
thorizes Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the
President and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implica-
tion, Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to
the situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this isthe proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presi-dential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was en-
acted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, (id not
purport to establish succession in instances where the President alone
was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether tho "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Con-
gress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution does
not vest any department or office with the power to determine inability,
or to decide the term during which the Vice President sllall act, or toleterrminre whether and at what time tlhe President may later regainli lprerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue tliat
article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the authority to make
all laws which shall bo necessary and proper for carrying out such
pIowors. b 0
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion infavor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is necessary,
and that a mere statute would not bo adequate to solve the problelil.
'The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the matter,Herbert Brownell, William 1. Rogers, and Deputy Attorney GeneralNicholas de. Katzonbach, have agreed an amendment is necessary.
In addition, the American Bar Association, the State bar associations ofNow York and Nebraska, and the Bar Association of the City ofNow York, have recently passed resolutions stating that a constitu-tional amendment is necessary to solve the problem.The most persuasive argument in favor of first amending theConstitution, before passing a Presidential inability statute, is that
so many legal questions have been raised about the authority ofCongress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge atthe most critical time-that is, either when a President had becomedisabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Underthese circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an enabling
amendment, so that Congress may proceed to resolve the problemby enacting a statute that cannot be questioned on constitutionalgrounds.
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ANALYSIS
The proposal recommended by the subcommittee is cast in the form
of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been out-
lined earlier, the primary reason being to remove any doubt that
Congress has the authority to enact legislation prescribing procedures
to determine the "commencement and termination" of an inability.
Article II, section 1, clause 6, of the Constitution is unclear on twoimportant points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates.
The first sentence would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inabilityfrom those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminat-ing any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in article
II, section 1, clause 6.
The second sentence makes it clear that it is not the "office" but the
"powers and duties of the office" which devolve on the Vice President,in the time of Presidential inability. By establishing the title of
Acting President, the proposal further clarifies the status of the Vice
President during the period when he is discharging the powers andduties of a disabled President. In addition, it is made clear that the
President may reassume the powers and (ldties of his office when hisliability has ended.
The third sentence clarifies the authority of Congress to legislate
on thle subject of Presidential succession, both in the case of removal,death, or resignation, and also in aiPresidential inability situation.
'lThe sentence states that, if both the President and( Vice Presidenthave been eliminated by removal, death, or resignation, then Congress
may declare 'what officer shall then be President." If neither the
President nor the Vice President is alle to function because of inability,
Congress may declare what officer shall "act as presidentt * * T
until a Plresident shall be elected, or * * * until the inability shall
be remlovedl."
In the summer of 1963, after hearings on presidential; inability hadbeen concluded, it was the consensus of this subcommittee that Senate
Joint Resolution 35 offered perhaps the best solution to the constitu-
tional gaps cited earlier. .
However, whenan assassin's bullet claimed the life of President
John,Fitzgerald Kennedy on November 22, 1963, Members of tileU.S. Senate and House of Representatives voiced renewed concern
over Presidential inability and vacancies in the Office of Vice President.
A variety of proposals to deal with these problems by amending theConstitution were introduced and referred to this subcommittee.
Because of the renewed concern of Members, because of the appar-
ent widespread public interest in these problems, and because of the
subcommnitteo's intense desire to find a reasonable solution that will
be accepted by the Congress and the several States, it was decided tohold a new seroie of hearings during the 2d session of the 88th Congress.
The subcommittee decided not to concern itself with laws relating
to Presidential succession, Congress is given the constitutional power
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to determine the line of succession after the Vice President. The first
succession law of 1792 placed the President pro tempore of the Senatefirst in line after the Vice President. The next succession law in 1886
placed the Secretary of State first in line after the Vice President.
Tile third and current succession law, passed in. 1947, placed the
Speaker of the House of Representatives first in line after the Vice
President. These adjustments in the lines of succession are made
from time to time as the Congress, in its wisdom, sees fit.
The subcommittee therefore decided to confine its hearings to the
vexing problems of the inability of a President and the difficultiespresented whenever a vacancy exists-as it has 17 times in our his-tory-in the Office of Vice President.
The subcommittee is helpful of finding a solution to these problems
that will provide reasonable machinery to obviate the problems ofinability and vacancies in the Vice Presidency without burdening theConstitution with procedural details. The subcommittee also will
strive for a solution that will leave to the Congress, as representatives
of the people, the ultimate determination in matters of inability andfilling vacancies in the Vice Presidency.
APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES
Senate Joint Resolution 36 introduced by Messrs. Kefauver and
Keating, and later sponsored by Mr. Dodd, was referred by the full
committee to the subcommittee on February 18, 1963. After thepublic hearing of June 11, 1963, tl3 resolution was reported favorablyto the full committee on June 26, 1963.
The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 36 is to amend the Consti-
tution to enable tihe Congress to function effectively in time of emer-gency or disaster. It authorizes the executive authority of each State
to make temporary appointments to fill vacancies in its representationin the House of Representatives whenever such vacancies exceed one-third of the authorized membership of that body.
STATEMENT
When the Constitution was drafted, the ability to destroy people
on a mass basis by use of weapons of war could not be foreseen. ThePounding Fathers had no reason to assume that the membership ofthe House of Representatives might become so decimated overnightthat it would be rendered incapable of exercising its constitutionalfunctions in a time of crisis. Intending that Members of the House
of Representatives should always represent the will of the people, theframers of the Constitution insisted that all vacancies in that bodybe filled by special elections.With the advent of nuclear bombs and other weapons of massdestruction, vast areas can now be devastated almost instantaneously.We know that no system of defense is likely to be 100 percent effective.In any future war it is possible that the enemy will succeed in striking
some of our civilian communities, including the Nation's Capital.These advances in the technique of destruction, coupled with the
realities of the cold war, require reexamination of the ability of our
representative government to function in time of national disaster.Continuity of the Executive authority is protected by the act ofJune 25, 1948 (ch. 644, sec. 1, 62 Stat., p. 672), regulating Presidential
9
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succession. As long as the House of Representatives is available to
choose a Speaker, Presidential succession can be maintained. Thejudiciary could be reconstituted fairly readily by appointments bythe Chief Executive. By virtue of the 17th amendment to the Consti-
tution, vacancies in the Senate could be temporarily filled by appoint-
ments by the Governors of the respective States. But in the House
of Representatives, temporary appointments are not authorized.Vacancies must be filled by special elections (U.S. Constitution, art. I,
sec. 2), which require a minimum delay of 60 days even in normal
times. In times of destruction and chaos caused by nuclear attack
upon our shores, it might well be considerably longer before elections
could properly be conducted in many congressional districts.
This inability to provide continuity of representation offers no greatdifficulty in ordinary times. wlut in periods of national emergency ordisaster, it could well paralyze the functioning of representativegovernment. As an Administrator of Civil Defense stated previouslyin support of this measure-_
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of
Congress continuing to function in time of national emer-
gency. The functions of the Congress become ever moreimportant under such circumstances. The ability of theCongress to act swiftly is essential to the successful defense
of the Nation.
What would be the consequences if an atomic attack left the House
of Representatives to function without a majority of its Members?
Any Member might suggest the absence of a quorum. Parliamentary
precedents indicate that it would be ruled that a majority of the living
Members would constitute a quorum, but this still might not enable
the House to function. It is likely that any catastrophe which killed
a large number of Representatives would also incapacitate so many
that the House could not muster a majority of surviving Members.
It is ilmortant too that in such critical times the efficiency and repre-
sentative character of the Congress be preserved. Vital legislation
would be needed quickly and any disfranchisement of substantial
portions of our Nation would be undesirable for many reasons. It
may be suggested that the Chief Executive would stop into thebroach and act without legislative sanction in the national interest ashe perceived it at such a time. But this might not give the same
national unity as a. President supported by a fully constituted Con-
gress and there need be no departure from constitutional representa-
tive government if precautionary steps are taken in advance of atomic
catastrophe. There is no reason why vacancies in the House, where
revenue measures must originate, should not be filled with the samedispatch as those in the Senate. This amendment is a precautionary
step which is comparable to civil defense measures and stepped-up
military preparedness. It is not born of hysteria, but represents a
readiness to continue the orderly processes of government in all events.
Its speedy adoption will demonstrate to the enemies of freedom that
America is prepared governmentally as well as militarily, if they
choose to precipitate World War III.The subject matter of this resolution has been before the Senate
since the 81st Congress when Senator William Knowland introducedSenate Joint Resolution 145 along the same lines. In the 82d Con-gress, public hearings were held on Senate Joint Resolution 59. In
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the 83d Congress, public hearings were held on Senate Joint Resolution39, which passed the Senate by a vote of 70 to 1 on June 4, 1954. Inthe 84th Congress, public hearings were held on Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 8, and this resolution, as amended, passed the Senate by a vote of76 to 3 on May 19, 1955. During the 85th Congress, Selate JointResolution 157 was introduced, but no action was taken on it. In the86th Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 39 passed the Senate 70 to 18
on February 2, 1960, although two additional articles were added to the
resolution on the floor of the Senate.
In the 87th Congress, Senators Kefauver and Keating introducedSenate Joint Resolution 123, which was similar in substance to Senate
Joint Resolution 39, the resolution sponsored by Senator Knowland
which passed the Senate in the 83d Congress, and Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 85, which was introduced in the 86th Congress by Senator
Keating. Senate Joint Resolution 123 was approved in a report bythe Attorney General, and the subcommittee recommended to theCommittee on the Judiciary that the joint resolution be reportedfavorably to the Senate. The Judiciary Committee reported Senate
Joint Resolution 123 favorably to the Senate, but no further action
was taken with regard to it during the 87th Congress.
During the present Congress, Senators Kefauver and Keatingintroduced Senate Joint Resolution 36, which is identical to Senate
Joint Resolution 123 of the 87th Congress. Hearings were deemed
unnecessary because of the clear and immediate need for action, the
extensive hearings and debate in previous Congresses, and the over-
whelming support which the proposal has received in tile past. TheSubcommitt(,o on Constitutional Amendments considered the matter
on June 25, 1963, and unanimously recommended to tile Committee
on the Judiciary that it report Senate Joint Resolution 36 favorably
and without amendment.
ANALYSIS
Theo power to appoint Representatives arises only when the vacan-
cies in the House exceed one-third of its authorized melmborshi.
The present membership of the House being 435, 146 vacancies wouldhave to exist before this extraordinary power could be invoked. The
number of vacancies could exist for several days, but as appointments
are made by the Governors pursuant to this amendment, the number
of vacancies naturally will diminish. On the date that the vacancies
total less than 146, the time limit on this power begins to run. Fromthat date, the Governors have 60 days within which to make the
temporary appointments or the authority lapses and the office mustbe filled by election. If within the 60-day period, additional vacancies
arise from any cause, they also may be filled by gubernatorial appoint-
ment. After the number of vacancies drops below 146, if it arises
above that figure again, the power to appoint again comes into
existence.
Appointments made pursuant to the authority are temporary in
nature. Article I, section 2, of the Constitution, will still mandatorily
require that a Governor issue writs of election when vacancies occurin the representation of his State in the House of Representatives.This amendment, by specific reference, emphasizes this requirement,
so that, depending upon conditions in the various States, the ap-pointee's term should be limited to from 50 to 90 days.
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Although the amendment is designed for disaster-type situations,
the text of the resolution contains no reference to emergency or dis-
aster. Such specification would raise such questions as the determina-
tion and proclamation of a disaster, whether only vacancies causedby the disaster should be filled by appointment, and the particular
vacancies resulting from the disaster. These problems are not pre-
sented because the power to appoint is brought into being by a factual
condition which will be readily ascertainable; namely, the existence
of 146 vacancies in the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the
very existence of so many vacancies in the House of Representatives
presupposes a disaster and surely cannot occur short of some cata-
strophic occurrence. The maintenance of a large number of vacancies
as a prerequisite to use of the appointive power assures that it will
only be used in the event of a disaster and prevents any possibility of
abuse.
Any catastrophe which produces the operative number of vacancies
will probably be accompanied by breakdowns in communications,disorder, and confusion in both State and Federal Governments, and
vacancies in other public offices. Nevertheless, it is desirable that
some procedure be devised by which the executive authorities of the
various States will be notified that their appointive power has come
into being. Section 2 of the article authorizes Congress to enactlegislation establishing some such procedure. However, the consti-
tutional authority for the temporary appointments will never depend
upon whether any particular notification procedure has been followed.
It thus avoids the pitfalls of trying to provide constitutionally for all
the difficulties which might prevent a specified mode of notification
from being carried out.
Should unforeseen difficulties arise as a result of this grant of
authority, the House of Representatives will continue to act as thefinal arbiter by reason of its constitutional authority to be the judge
of the qualifications of its own Members (U.S. Constitution, art. 1,
sec. 5).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is the fervent hope of the subcommittee that the authority
granted in this resolution need never be used. However, with ourknowledge of the tremendous destructive power of thermonuclear
weapons, it would be the height of folly to leave a constitutional gap
of this nature in a representative government such as ours. When
whole cities may be obliterated in a split second, the Congress cannotignore, should it have any inclination to do so, the realities of thisdanger. The time for action to erase a defect in our Constitution,
which could not have been contemplated at the time of its adoption,is at hand. Let us hope it is not overdue.
In view of the current international crisis, the subcommittee be-lieved that approval of this resolution is more appropriate and more
needed than at any time in its previous legislative history. The
United States is making every effort and sparing no expense to dem-
onstrate to our enemies that we are determined to resist them and
to defend freedom at all costs. While calling for personal sacrifice
and increased military preparation, the subcommittee was of the
opinion that we should not at the same time ignore this unnecessaryloophole in our Constitution. In the opinion of the subcommittee,
swift approval of this resolution by the Congress will demonstrate
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that America is preparing governmentally, as well as militarily, todefend itself if our enemies choose to precipitate world war III.
As a constitutional amendment, this measure must secure the ap-
proval of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and the ratificationby the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States. Since this
action may be somewhat time consuming, and time is of the essencehere, the subcommittee believes that this legislation should be ap-proved promptly by the Senate.
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Senate Joint Resolution 37, introduced by Messrs. Kefauver and
Keating, was referred by the committee to the subcommittee on
February 18, 1963. On June 25, 1963, it was reported favorably by
the subcommittee to the full committee.
PURPOSE
The purpose of the proposed amendment is to amend the Constitu-
tion to enable persons who have moved across State lines or from one
election district to another within States, to nevertheless vote inpresidential elections if they are otherwise qualified. It limits the
maximum residence requirement which a State may impose for votingin presidential elections at 90 days. It also provides that a person
who does not meet a residence requirement may nevertheless vote in apresidential election if such person is otherwise qualified to vote therein
and would also have been qualified to vote in the presidential election
at the place from which he moved, except for the fact of changing
residence.
STATEMENT
The problem of disfranchisement or our mobile population from
voting for the Nation's Clief Executive is a serious one. According
to Census Bureau figures 19,800,000 American adults moved in 1961.Of these, 13.2 million moved within their counties, 6.6 million movedfrom county to county, and 3 million from State to State. This
mobility of our population and its free movement from one State to
another is a desirable and necessary feature of 20th century America,
and all indications are that this is an increasing trend. HoweverState residence requirements for voting have not kept pace with thisfact of modern life in America. Three States require 2 years of resi-dence before a person can vote for President. Thirty-five States
require 1 year and 12 call for 6 months. Appended is a table showingthe residence requirements of all the States. Furthermore, within
each State, persons may lose their right to vote in all elections merelybecause they have changed their county or precinct of residence.
Three States require that the voter shall have resided in the county
of his residence for 1 year, and eight require 6 months' residence.Precinct requirements vary widely, ranging from 30 days or a few
months to 1 year.
The victims of these outmoded residence requirements include
many of our citizens who are best equipped to exercise the right of
voting. They are educators, lawyers, clergymen, and executives ofinterstate businesses. A General Electric Co. spokesman reportedthat 6 percent of its executive personnel were disfranchised in the
S. lept. 1017, 88-2--- 3
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1960 presidential election because they had been shifted from one
State to another in the company's organization. Interstate businesses
engaged in manufacturing or distribution shift managers, salesmen,
and other executives constantly. Others who are penalized by out-
moded residence requirements are those who act in the best American
tradition who have the initiative to pull up stakes and move to take
advantage of new opportunities.
In a survey of the 1952 election, 12 percent of the people who had
not voted said they were disfranchised by residence requirements.
Studies by V. O. Key estimated in 1958 that residence requirementsprobably excluded more than 5 percent of the potential electorate
from exercising the ballot. The American Heritage Foundation has
estimated that 8 million adult American citizens were barred from the
ballot box in the 1960 elections by inability to meet State, county, or
precinct residence requirements. It is significant that Idaho, the
State which had the highest voter-participation figure in the Nationin 1960 (80.7 percent) is also a State of relatively moderate residence
requirements (6 months in State, 30 days in county).
It is frequently complained that too many eligible citizens who are
able to vote do not exercise their precious privilege at the ballot box.
It is shameful at the same time to continue a system of arbitrary
restrictions which preclude millions of our best citizens from participat-ing in the choice of their President. Apart from the possible effects
of this upon election results, it is certain to produce apathy and bitter-
ness in such people toward the Government which cheats them of their
democratic birthright because they have changed their residence.
The American people do not wish this evil to be continued. The
American
-Heritage Foundation, which has a program to modernize
residence requirements for voting, reports widespread editorial and
popular support for relief of our mobile population's disfranchisement.
The need for action is clear.
It many be conceded that this problem would be best handled at thelocal level if that solution were available as a reasonable alternative.
But this is not being effectively done. Organizations of State officialshave been conscious of this-problem and working toward solutions at
the State level for a number of years. The General Assembly of
States, an organization serviced by the Council of State Governments,has been working for corrective action at the State level since 1952,
when it recommended that the organization concern itself with
absentee voting legislation which would prevent the loss of voting
rights for persons who moved from one State to another. The
National Association of Secretaries of State in its 1953 convention
approved a proposed based upon Connecticut legislation which would
permit former residents of a State to vote there for President and
Vice President by absentee ballot until they become qualified under
the residence requirements of their new domicile. In 1955, the Coin-
mittee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation approved as a
part of its program a draft act along the same lines.
Jn 1956, the 84th Congress urged the States to take corrective ac-
tion by reciprocal agreements. House Concurrent Resolution 94,
sponsored by Representative Curtis of'Massachusetts, passed the
House of Representatives, June 30, 1955, and the Senate agreed to the
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resolution on January 16, 1956. By its terms, the Congress ex-pressed itself as favoring and recommended to the States-
the consideration of appropriate legislation to enable a per-
son to vote for President and Vice President when such per-
son would be eligible to vote but for the fact that he had
moved from one State to another and had not yet fulfilled
the residence requirements of such State to which he had
moved (70 Stat. 34).
However, despite 9 years of efforts by Congress and these organizations
of State officials, only a handful of States have taken corrective action.
They are California, Connecticut, Missouri, Ohio, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. Legislation adopted in Connecticut in 1953 allows a
voter moving from the State to vote by absentee ballot for a 24
months' period after he has moved, provided he does not become a
qualified voter at his new residence. Vermont adopted a similar
measure in 1957. Wisconsin adopted a different approach in 1954by providing that a person who does not meet its residence require-
ment shall nevertheless be entitled to vote in presidential electionsif he was either a qualified voter in another State immediately prior
to moving to Wisconsin, or would have been eligible in such other
State had he remained there until such election, and provided further
that he is otherwise qualified except for the residence requirement.
The new voter need only move to Wicsonsin in time to register atleast 10 days before election. (The Wisconsin law is the model for
sec. 2 of S.J. Res. 37.) In 1958, California and Missouri adopted
constitutional amendments relaxing requirements for new residents
to 54 days in California and 60 days in Missouri. In 1959, Ohio
adopted similar legislation setting the residence period at 40 days.
In 1960, the Oregon constitution was amended by referendum to
authorize its legislature to permit otherwise qualified new residents
to vote in presidential elections.
While these States are to be commended for modernizing their
residence requirements, the smallness of their number is not-encourag-ing. However, the committee does not believe that the slowness of
corrective action by the States is due to any desire to perpetuate
artificial and. unfair residence restrictions to bar otherwise qualified
voters from the polls. The residence requirements of virtually allStates are contained in their State constitutions. Amendments to
State constitutions are generally slow, cumbersome, and expensiveprocedures, and it is believed that this explains the inertia of a majority
of States. Legislation passed by the New Jersey Legislature in 1960,
similar to the Connecticut model, was vetoed by the Governor upon
advice that it violated the New Jersey State constitution. This
resulted in adoption of a resolution by the New Jersey Association ofCounty Boards of Election petitioning the Congress to adopt suchlegislation as would be binding on each State and uniformly permit
voters who move across State lines to vote in presidential elections.
Residence qualifications for voting generally serve but two legiti-
mate purposes: (1) to allow the voter to become acquainted with local
problems and candidates, and (2) to prevent election frauds anddouble voting. The first should be irnnaterial in national presidential
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elections. The second purpose will not be handicapped by this
amendment.
There should be no fear that the short period will open new ways to
election frauds or double voting. A person has but one residence at a
given time and the date of presidential elections is uniform throughout
the country. Residence is a fact to be determined in the administra-
tion of all election laws, regardless of the period for which it must have
existed. The great majority of States have county residence require-
ments applying to all elections which are as short as this 90-day
requirement for State residence and the latter can be enforced just as
well, and in the same manner, as county residence requirements.
The proposed amendment would immediately become a part of
the supreme law of each State. It would also provide a uniform system
throughout the country. The present pattern of varying and conflict-ing approaches by the States to the problem, even if continued, could
not produce the desired solution. For instance, a qualified voter now
moving from Connecticut to Wisconsin may vote in either State, by
absentee ballot in Connecticut or in Wisconsin by virtue of its special
residence requirement. But a voter moving from Wisconsin to Con-
necticut is disqualified under the laws of both States. Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution is thus tile simplest, fastest, and most effective
means of dealing with this problem.
During the 87th Congress, Senator Kefauver introduced Senate
Joint Resolution 14 and Senator Keating introduced Senate Joint
Resolution 90 on this subject. Senate Joint Resolution 14 would have
set at 1 year the maximum residence period for voting in presidential
elections and would also have required States to allow a person mov-ing therefrom to vote by absentee ballot for a period of 2 years if the
voter had not become qualified in another State, the latter provision)eing modeled after the Connecticut statute mentioned above. Senate
Joint Resolution 90 simply set the maximum residence period at 90days. These proposals were included in the hearings conducted by
the Subconmmittee oil Constitutional Amendments on tlie Federal
Elections Systemiduring May, June, and July, 1961. 'The chairmen of})oth the Republican and Democratic National Committees supl)ortel
the objective of both resolutions, along with political scientists and
representatives of civic organizations. Tlhe executive director of the
AmericanIleritage Foundation suggested a combination of the two
proposals, a short-residence requirement with some additional provi-
sion securing the vote to those who move within its period.
On August 3, 1961, tile Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
ments considered Senate Joint Resolution 14 and Senate Joint Reso-
lution 90 and agreed that some proposal along the lines just mentioned
should be reported favorably. This resulted in Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 128, which was introduced on August 28, 1961, by Senator
Keating and Senator Kefauver. It incorporated the 90-day period
proposed by Senator Keating. Instead of the Connecticut approach,
which would have required the States to establish special absenteeballoting procedures for voters moving away, the new resolutioninstead adopted the Wisconsin approach, mentioned above, which
enables the otherwise qualified citizen to vote in the State to whichlie moves. On September 1, 1961, the Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Amenldments recommended to theCommittee on the Judiciary
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that it report Senate Joint Resolution 128 favorably and without
amendment, but the Committee on the Judiciary did not do so during
the 87th Congress.
In the 88th Congress, Senators Kefauver and Keating introduced
Senate Joint Resolution 37, which is identical to Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 128 of the 87th Congress. Since extensive hearings were con-ducted on this subject during the 87th Congress, the Subcommittee
Dnl Constitutional Amendments was of the opinion that no furtherhearings need be had, and it has recommended to the Committee on
the Judiciary that it report Senate Joint Resolution 37 favorably
and without amendment.
ANALYSIS
Section 1 of the proposed amendment would establish 90 days as
the maximum period of residence which may be imposed by any State
or the District of Columbia as a qualification for voting in presidential
elections. It applies to State, county, or precinct residence require-
nments. However, it leaves the State free to require lesser periods of
residence.
Section 2 is designed to allow voting by persons who move into aState prior to an election but still cannot meet its residence require-
mIent. For instance, a 90-day period will not meet the needs of per-
sons who move on September 1, a popular moving date, before aNovember election. This section is patterned after Wisconsin's law(sec. 9.045, West's, Wisconsin Statutes Annotated), which allows a
person to vote in Wisconsin who does not meet its residence require-
ment but is otherwise qualified and who has moved from a State wherehe was qualified to vote or would have been so qualified had he re-
mained there until election. (The latter provision protects the per-
son who becomes of voting age after moving.) The effect of section
2 is to make the provisions of the Wisconsin law a part of the supremelaw of the land and thus a part of the laws of each State and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. However, it also applies to movements within aState, from county to county, or precinct to precinct, if tile only im-
I)pediment to a person's voting is the residence requirement of such a
subdivision. However, to take advantage of section 2, the voter mustl)e otherwise qualified, except for residence, under the laws of bothStates. After 90 days of residence (or any lesser period which a State
may provide), he will be required to meet only the voting qualifications
of the State of his new residence.
This leaves the States free to enact such reasonable rules and
regulations as may be necessary to administer their voting laws,including the residence qualification, and protect their elections fromfraud. The article applies only to "residents" in the established
meaning of the word, not to transients or persons temporarily in theState. In Wisconsin, for instance, the new voter taking advantage
of the waiver of residence provision must submit a certified statementfrom the municipal clerk of his former residence as to his qualifications
and must present an affidavit certifying his qualifications from twofreeholders in the Wisconsin precinct where he seeks to vote. Of
course, special ballots in addition to the special procedures will be
required, but this is a hardship which has been voluntarily undertakenin at least six States and it is not believed that it will unduly burden
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election officials in other States. Registration laws would not be
affected and the States could still require the voters be registered
within a reasonable period in advance of an election so that properinvestigation for possible fraud can be conducted. State penal
statutes for fraudulent voting practices will continue to be enforceable
and unlawfully cast ballots would be subject to challenge.
The committee wishes to emphasize that these provisions apply
only to elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors. Itdoes not apply to local and State elections, elections of Congressmen
and Senators, or to presidential primaries. It is recognized that
acquaintance with local problems and candidates over some period
may be logical and desirable for these other elections, but the President
of the United States is the representative of all the people of the
United States and it is extremely unlikely that a person's change of
residence will, or should, have any effect upon their choice of President.
CONCLUSION
The time has come to correct the increasing problem of disfranchise-
ment of mobile American citizens. It is a national shame that 8
million adult Americans are barred from the ballot box at presidential
elections merely because they have shifted their place of residence.
Senate Joint Resolution 37 offers a uniform, simple and effective
means of dealing with the problem. It is urged that the Congressgive it prompt approval in order that it may be submitted to theStates for ratification as soon as possible.
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Residence requirements for voting in presidential elections
Requirements
State
Election district, Township,
State County precinct, or municipality,
ward town, or city
Alabama.-- -----------
Alaska--------------------
Arizona.----- ----------
Arkansas.....--------------
California------------
Colorado -----------------.
Connecticut-------------
Delaware .---- -------
Florida.....---------------
Georgia.-----------------
Iawaii...-----------------
Idaho.-------------------
Illinois.--------------
Indiana ------------------
Iowa ..--------------------
Kansas..-------------------
Kentucky .---------------
- Louisiana .--------- ..-- .
Maine -----------.-------
Maryland .----------.----
Massachusetts------------
Michigan.......------
Minnesota.--------------
Mlssissippi...-------------
Missouri.----------------.
Montana ..----------------
Nebraska -.-----------
Nevada .-----.------.
New Hampshire .-----.--
NewJersey.---.-------
New Mexico.--------.
New York.-------------
North Carolina.----------
North Dakota....-------
Ohio.----- --------..
Oklahoma....------------
Oregon...-----------------
Pennsylvania ---.-- .---
Rhode Island-.---
South Carolina.----------
South Dakota..------------
T'ennessee..--------------
Texas .--------------
Utah..._---.----- .-
Vermont.--.----------.-
Virginia...-- .--...---
Washington..------
West Virglnlias...-----.WLsconsln...-- -------------
Wyoming --.--------------
2 years ----------1 year----------
-----do-. -----
--- do --.---------
--.--do ------
-.d 8_---------
--.-do...-----
-.do....------
----.do..--.-------
---- do-----------
6 months -------.
1 year.---------.6 months.------
-_-edo...---------
---- do..-- --.--
1 year-----------
-----do
.---------6 months........
1 year ---------.....
----do--...--
6 months----
---- do.------------
2 years. -----
6 months..-------
- do-----
.do .-----------
_, -d ..- .
1 year. ---------
.....do .....-......
- do -
---- do.-...--------o"- ---
.--.do l...........
----- do...------.--
6 months .--------1 year 14
---------
---- do.-..-----.--
2 years I -
1 year ----------.
--- do.....--------
.do -............
--..
do
-----------
....
do
.--.----..--
-
--- do ...-------. .
..-----------
.....do.............
---- do '--.-----.---
.---.do.-----.--
1 year .------
30days -------
6 months-.-------
3 months 4---
----do
-..-----
3 months.-------
6 months -------
----do ....-----
30 days.---------3 months -----
2 months 6---
6 months..------.-
1 year.----------3 months 1 ------
6 months.-----..
. . .
,----- --
0 day .........
2 months ..
2 months..--.
3 months 4-----
4 months ..----..
3 months 4-..-
40 days I.---6 months ...----.-
1 year..-----3 months 4 ---
-. do....-----
6 months..---.--
4 months.--------
6 months-..'Months. -- --
3 months 8..---. -
2 months 8..
3 months I..-
20days s -----
30 days....-----
- .do.----------
54 days-.-----
16 days-
30days.--------
3 months..------
30 days..-------
----do-...------
30 days....-------2 months------.
3 months-.-.-
6 months '..--..--
30 days....-----.
1 year ......-----.
2 months ..--.-
i-da.y.........-
6 months........
30 days ...-------.
...--do.............
..... do ...........
40 days..................
30 days...........-(I). ---- .2 months .-----
4 months.-------
30 days....-------
6 months..------
2 months
__----4
30 days...-------
-. ..-do.....------
10days....-----
---do ..-------
30 days.6 months.'
2 months,'
30 days.
4 months.7
3 months.
-6 months.'
30 days.
6 months.
15 days."l
6 months.
3 months.
6 months.
I Otherwise qualified electors who have moved to a new precinct in the same county, town, or city may
vote in their old precincts.
' In election district.
3 New residents in the State may vote for President and Vice President only, after 64 days of residence.90 days.
' No elector who has changed his residence from one county, precinct, or town to another loses his right
to vote In his former county, precinct, or town until he acquires voting residence in the new one.560 days,NMunlclp)allty.I"Plantation."
' Ministers and wives may vote after 6 months' residence.10 New residents in the State may vote for President and Vice President only, after 60 days of residence.
" In city of 4th class.2 40-day residence requirement when voting for President and Vice President.13 Voter must reside in precinct in which he registers.
'o6 months If previously an elector or native of the United States.3 i'ublic school teachers and spouses may vote after 6 months' residence.
" 10-day precinct residence requirement when voting for President and Vice President,
9.869604064
Table: Residence requirements for voting in presidential elections
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The present system for election of President and Vice President is
embodied in article II, section 1, and the 12th amendment (1804) of
the Constitution. It provides that they shall be chosen by electors
appointed by each State in the manner directed by its legislature,
each State to have a number of electors equal to the total of its
Senators and Representatives. The 23d amendment now gives the
District of Columbia the number of electors to which it would be
entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least popu-lous State. The electors for each State must meet separately in their
respective States and ballot separately for the President and Vice
President, at least one of whom shall not be an inhabitant of their
State. A majority vote of all electors is necessary for election to
each office. Absent a majority, the House of Representatives elects
the President from the three candidates receiving the largest number
of votes. In such an election, each State casts but a single vote, a
majority of the State congressional delegation thus controlling the
vote of a State. A majority of votes is necessary to elect, and in the
absence of such a majority the Vice President acts as President. In
the absence of a majority of vice-presidential electoral votes, theSenate elects the Vice President from the two highest candidates by a
simple majority vote.
The foregoing is the entire constitutional foundation for the elec-
tion of the most important political office in the world. In consider-ing the various pending proposals on the electoral college it is seen
that each is a careful attempt to correct the inequities and dangers of
the present outmoded relic. It has been said of the present system:
Originally adopted as a compromise, the electoral college
resulted from a distrust of the people and conditions ofgeography and communications which no longer exist.
Despite its confusion and uncertainties, by sheer luck it has
managed in most instances to elect a President who reason-
ably reflected the choice of a majority of the people. But this
good fortune has lulled us into inaction after each election
and the system has continued from ene election to the next.
Every 4 years the electoral college is a loaded pistol pointed
at our system of government. Its continued existence is agame of Russian roulette. Once its antiquated procedures
trigger a loaded cylinder, it may be too late for the needed
corrections.
We cannot assume that U.S. Presidents for the space age
can continue to go into office in the oxcart furnished by the
electoral college.
This subject produced the greatest interest of all those included in
the subcommittee's hearings. There are many separate resolutions,
sponsored by numerous Senators, which would change in some way
the constitutional method of electing the President. These proposals
may be divided generally among the following basic plans:
1. Direct national election.
2. The proportional system.
3. rhe, district system.
4. Perfection of present system.
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(1) Direct national election would effect the greatest change in the
present system. The electoral college (meaning the individual electors)
and the electoral votes of the States would be totally abolished.
Instead, the President would be elected directly by nationwide popular
vote. This plan requires a majority of the total popular vote for
election and provides for a runoff election among the top two candi-
dates in the event none receives a majority in the first instance. Under
the plan a plurality of the total popular vote would be sufficient for
election.
In 1934, a proposal for direct national election was defeated 59 to 29in the Senate. In 1950, when the Senate approved the proportional
system, a floor amendment proposing direct national election wasdefeated 63 to .28. In 1956, when. the Senate again conTsidered the
proportional system, a similar amendment was defeated 66 to 17.(2) Proportional system.-Some pending resolutions are based on
the so-called Lodge-Gossett plan which would retain electoral votesbut divide each State's electoral votes among the candidates in pro-
portion to their shares of its total popular vote. Presidential electors
are abolished and the people in each State would vote directly for the
candidates for President.
The proportional allocation of each State's electoral votes is carried
to the nearest thousandth. Forty percent of the total number of
electoral votes is necessary for election, in the absence of which
election is by majority vote of a joint session of the House and Senate.
Voting qualifications in each State are the same as those for electing
the most numerous branch of its legislature.
Some resolutions differ from Lodge-Gossett plan in that a plurality
of electoral votes is sufficient for election and the proportional di-
vision of each State's electoral votes is computed beyond one-thous-
andth if a more detailed calculation would change the result.
Other resolutions add to Lodge-Gossett a provision that the places
and manner of holding elections in each State shall be regulated by itslegislature. They also contain provisions for nomination by primary
elections.
The Lodge-Gossett plan passed the Senate in 1950 by a vote of
65 to 27. In the House a motion to suspend the rules for its con-
sideration was defeated 210 to 134. This plan was favorably reportedby the Senate Judiciary Conmmittee again in 1955. Before it came to a
vote, its principal sponsors offered a compromise substitute by which
each State would choose between the proportional system or the dis-
trict system. When the substitute amendment was agreed to by a
vote of only 48 to 37, the principal sponsors moved to recommit the
resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary.(3) District system.-This plan retains the electoral college but
changes the method of choosing electors. Two electors from each
State are to be elected by plurality of the popular vote from the State
at large. All additional electors are to bte elected from single-electordistricts. Unlike recent proposals of the district system (Mundt-Coudert), the districts will not necessarily correspond to congressionaldistricts. Separate presidential elector districts are to be establishedindependently by the States under a requirement that they be com-pact, contiguous in territory, and contain, as nearly as practicable,
equal populations within each State. A majority of electoral votes
continues to be necessary for election in the electoral college, in the
absence of which election is by a joint session of the House and Senate.
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Except for the 1955 Senate vote, which offered each State the choicebetween the proportional and district plans, no constitutional amend-
ment proposing a district system has been brought to a vote in eitherHouse since 1826. Prior to that date, some form of district system
was considered in both Houses but never received the requisite two-thirds vote of either.(4) Perfection of present system.-This plan proposes to perfectthe present system as it is generally expected to function. It would
eliminate the individual presidential electors and allow the peoplein each State to vote directly for President and Vice President.
The electoral votes of each State would be awarded automatically
to the candidate winning a plurality of its popular vote.
As is indicated by the number and variety of proposals, the hear-ings held by the subcommittee disclosed widespread dissatisfaction
with present constitutional methods but considerable disagreement
as to the aspects of the present system which should be changed
and the form which any change should take.
The unit rule system.--The first point of controversy is whether
to continue the present practice of awarding a State's entire electoral
vote to the candidate who receives the most popular votes. Most
supporters of this State-unit system concede that it operates to the
advantage of the most populous States. But they contend that this
only gives urban voters a compensating power for other features of
our present Federal-State political structure which favors ruralinterests. The malapportionment of many State legislatures infavor of rural voters and the composition of the House of Repre-
sentatives are cited as operating to the disadvantage of urban interests.
Those who would change the State-unit rule are sharply divided
among the district, proportional, and direct election proposals.
This division is reflected in a poll conducted of the opinions ofpolitical scientists. A questionnaire was mailed to 766 heads of
college political science departments. Of the 254 who responded,
46.9 percent favored the proportional system, 34.2 percent favoreddirect national election, and 16.2 percent supported the district plan.
The witnesses at th e subcommittee's hearings in the 87th Congress
were also widely divided. Of the witnesses other than sponsors who
testified in person or submitted special statements, the district system
was supported by Prof. Bower Aly of the University of Oregon;
Prof. W. J. Evans of Mississippi State University; J. Harvie Williams,
secretary, American Good Government Society; Lucius Wilmerding,
the National Association of Manufacturers; and Chairman William E.
Miller of the Republican National Committee. Former President
Harry S. Truman sublnitted a statement proposing a district system
utilizing congressional districts.
Thle proportional system was supported by Ed Gossett, president,
American Good Government Society; Prof. Kenneth Kofmehl of
Purdue University; Prof. Paul J. Piccard of Florida State University;
Oregon Governor Mark O. Hatfield; and Fred G. Sherrill, of Los
Angeles, Calif.
Direct national election was supported by Prof. Paul T. David of
the University of Virginia, Prof. Ralph G. Goldman of Michigan
State University, Prof. Avery Leiserson of Vanderbilt University,
and Prof. David B. Truman of Columbia University. (Professor
Piccard's first preference is direct national election. He supported
the proportional plan as a feasible compromise.)
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Retention or perfection of the present State-unit system was sup-
ported by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney- General;
Democratic National Chairman John M. Bailey; Dean Stephen K.
Bailey of the MTaxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs, Syracuse University; and Gus Tyler, director, Political
Department, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. (Mr.
Tyler's preference is direct national election.)
However, there is more common ground among proponents of thedistrict, proportional, and direct election plans than is generally
realized. Despite the fact that the district and proportional plans
would retain the States' electoral votes and direct election would
totally eliminate them, and despite some fundamental differences
between the district and proportional plans, there are several objec-
tives which would be accomplished by the ,idopLion of any one of the
three plans.
Giving each State a minimum of three electoral votes regardless of
population was originally intended to federalize presidential elections
and prevent the larger States from dictating the choice. Despite
this, the more populous urban States have come into dominance
because of the operation of the unit rule.
In a statement submitted for the subcommittee's hearings in the87th Congress, former President Trunman says:
The electoral college was first devised to protect the small
States from dominance by the larger States, as for example,
Delaware and Rhode Island from being dominated by
Virginia and New York.
The problem we face today is that of the emergence of thebig cities into political overbalance, with the threat of im-
posing their choices on the rest of the country.
Former President Hoover sounded a similar note in writing to
Senator Iefauver concerning the subcommittee's hearings:
Your subject is important. It confronts the same diffi-
culties as were met by the Founding Fathers-that is, to
prevent domination by a few large States.
'The large States are generally the so-called pivotal States which
1may go either way. Presidential candidates understandably emplha-
size their campaigns in these States because of the large blocks of
electoral votes which may be won by the slightest margin in popular
votes. The district, proportional, and direct election plans all would
reduce the power of these States. All would split them as electoral
units and prevent a State's entire weight from being thrown to one
candidate. Whether expressed in popular votes or electoral votes,
each of the three plans would divide the elective strength of suchStates between the principal candidates.
It is also charged that the present system unduly favors the "swing
votes" of minority groups in these pivotal States. They may hold
the balance of power and be able to tip the State's popular voteplurality, and hence its entire electoral vote, to the candidate whobest appeals to them. By splitting the unit votes of the pivotalStates, the district, proportional, and direct election plans would
each eliminate the basis of power of such bloc votes.
The disfranchisemenI in each State of voters who are in the minorityis another principal objection. Millions of popular votes are not
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reflected in the national electoral vote totals merely because they
were exceeded in their States. Again, the proportional, district, anddirect national election systems would all meet this inequity to somedegree. The proportional system and direct national election would
each insure that all minority votes in each State are counted in the
national total. The district system would accomplish a similar resultin the majority of States, particularly in the more heavily populated
ones, depending upon whether its use splits the State's electoral
vote-which is not to be expected imi all States.
The tendency of both parties to ignore so-called sure States where
one party has a clear majority would be affected by all three proposals.The minority party's strength in a previously sure State would
always be reflected in the national totals under the proportional anddirect national election systems. Under the district system the
minority could capture electoral votes wherever it could win one or
more districts despite losing the State at large.One other factor should be mentioned. The possibility of a minorityPresident (one who obtains a majority of the electoral votes eventhough an opponent receives more popular votes) is a characteristic
of the present system which causes much concern. We have had
three such Presidents, in 1824, 1876, and 1888. (On 11 other occa-
sions, the Presidentreceived less than a majority of the total popular
vote but outpolled his nearest opponent.) Although the district andproportional plans may differ in their effect on this possibility, anyproposal which preserves the electoral votes of the-States necessarilyperpetuates the possibility of a minority President. In fact the con-
stitutional purpose of the three-electoral-vote minimum is to insure
that mere numbers of votes cannot determine the Presidency. Onlydirect national election will fully remedy this.
This points up the fact that the so-called popular vote is a fiction.
It will continue to be a fiction so long as the people do not vote nation-
ally, but vote instead by State units, and so long as -they vote fortickets of electors instead of for the candidates themselves. This is
illustrated by the 1960 election in Alabama, where most Democratic
voters cast their ballots for a ticket of five Kennedy electors and six
unpledged electors (who eventually voted for Senator Byrd). It isimpossible to apply the popular vote concept to this situation. It is
therefore impossible to compute popular vote totals for the candidatesin Alabama or the Nation in 1960.
The practical effects of the various proposals on these and other
characteristics of the present system are analyzed objectively and atlength in a recent study by the staff of the subcommittee.Aside from the question of changing the unit rule system, there is
considerably greater agreement in the proposed amendments. There
are two other aspects of the present constitutional system which mostproposals would correct and there is little disagreement as to the form
which the corrections should take. These are (1) the office of presi-dential elector and (2) the contingent election in the House of Repre-
sentatives when no candidate has a majority of the electoral votes.
THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR
Under present constitutional provisions, the elector is free to exercisehis independent judgment in voting, regardless of whether he isinstructed by State law or has given a pledge, or whether his own
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name was even on the ballot. This power to frustrate thelpopular
will has seldom been used, but its continued existence is unnecessary
under any system.
In 1960, Henry D. Irwin, a Republican presidential elector in
Oklahoma, voted for Senator Byrd in the electoral college. Mr. Irwin
was a member of the regular Republican ticket and was expected to
vote for Vice President Nixon. On July 13, 1961, Mr. Irwin testified
at length at the subcommittee's hearings. He--revealed that his
action resulted from a movement of substantial proportions designed
to utilize the independence of electors in order to control the results
of the election. The subcommittee received evidence that a similar
movement had already been launched to subvert the 1964 election.
The 1960 election also saw in two States the appointment of un-pledged electors for the first time since the early days of the Nation.
Votes were cast and recorded in the electoral college for persons who
were not even candidates. Not only is this permitted by present
constitutional provisions but it is actually a return to the operation
of the system as contemplated by the Founding Fathers. Voters place
the choice in such electors and do not know for whom they may be
voting for President. If unpledged electors were to hold the balance
of power in a-close election, they could personally control the outcomeby voting for either major candidate or they could throw the electioninto the House of'Representatives by voting for a third person.
A third defect in the present constitutional status of electors is the
absolute power which each State legislature has over their appoint-
ment. The U.S. Supreme Court held long ago that present consti-tutional provisions give to each State legislature a. "plenary power"
over the appointment of presidential electors. Each legislature can
appoint the electors itself, as was done frequently in early years.
Also, each legislature can vary its State's elective method. from one
election to the next. In 1892, the Michigan Legislature adopted adistrict system for that one election in order to split the State's elec-
toral vote and thus salvaged five electoral votes for the candidate of
the party in control of the legislature. The subcommittee heard
testimony that a similar course was considered in one State in 1960.
In another State legislature, there was a movement after the election
to suspend the State's election laws and appoint independent electors.
All pending proposals would eliminate the possibility of independent
or unpledged electors. All would impose uniform systems which
could not be varied from State to State or from one election to the
next. Proposals of the proportional system and those which retainthe State unit rule totally eliminate the elector as an intermediarybetween the voter and the actual election. Electoral votes are re-
tained but are awarded automatically according to the popular vote.The district system provides that the people choose electors but an
amendment has been filed by its sponsors which requires that electorspledge their votes in advance. Direct national election obviously
solves these problems also since it eliminates both electors and electoral
votes.
CONTINGENT ELECTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
When the electoral college fails to produce a majority for one
candidate, the Constitution places the election in the House ofRepresentatives with the delegation of each State having one vote.
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Two Presidents have been elected in this manner, in 1800 and 1824.
Each State's vote is determined by the majority of its delegation.
In the event a State delegation is evenly split, the State would loseits vote. It is obviously unfair to give the 3-member delegation of
Nevada or Alaska the same voice as the 43-member delegation of
New York. The opportunity for a deadlock and third party balance
of power is also apparent. Most pending proposals would correct
this inequity by substituting election by a joint session of the House
and Senate with each Member having one vote. This would give eachState the same relative weight that it has in the electoral college.
On June 25, 1963, the subcommittee in executive session discussed
the seven proposals on the electoral college which were pending beforeit. This consideration finally focused itself into a choice betweenSenate Joint Resolution 12 and Senate Joint Resolution 27. The
proponents of each of these resolutions disagree with each other onbasic theory and their positions are not reconcilable. This division
of opinion on the electoral college reform plans traces itself all the wayback to the first plan and the early days of the Lodge-Gossett bills.Consequently, the subcommittee was unable to agree on either ofthese resolutions. Neither one could command a majority vote.
The impasse was resolved by reporting both bills to the full committee
without recommendation with an explanation of the subcommittee's
action.
EQUAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN
On February 18, 1963, Senate Joint Resolution 45 was introducedby Senator McGee for himself and 33 other Senators. This proposalis designed to secure equal rights for men and women and would forbiddenial or abridgement of equality of rights under the law on account
of sex. In the 87th Congress a similar bill, Senate Joint Resolution142, was approved by the subcommittee, the full committee, and theSenate (cf., S. Rept. 2192, 87th Cong., 2d sess.). Legislation alongthese lines has been before the Congress since adoption of the 19th
amendment to the U.S. Constitution first prohibited denial of voting
rights on account of sex. The pending resolution would completethe movement for legal equality for women. Like the 14th and 19th
amendments, the prohibitions of the proposed amendment would bedirected against acts of the States and the United States. It would
not apply to acts of individuals. Proponents of the amendment
maintain that it is particularly designed to establish equality of treat-
ment under laws touching upon employment.
STATEMENT
The United Nations Charter to which the United States is a
signatory, states in the preamble, as one of its objectives, the re-affirmatlon of faith in the equal rights of men and women. As a
signatory to this charter, the United States has subscribed to itsprinciples, including those expressed in the preamble. Supporters ofthis amendment contend, however, that this Nation has not kept pace
with other nations, including Egypt, Burma, Greece, Japan, WesternGermany, and Pakistan, all of which have given constitutional
equality to women.Opponents of the legislation caution against the amendment, notingthat the ramifications of a general statement to apply across the entire
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system of our jurisprudence are complex and perplexing. As to the
United Nations Charter, they point to chapter 1, article 2, section 7,
wherein it is stated:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state * * *.
Resolutions containing this proposal were reported by the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary in the 80th, 81st, 82d, 83d, 84th, 86th, and87th Congresses. In the 81st and 83d Congresses, the equal rightsproposal passed the Senate with an amendment, but was not acted
upon by the House of Representatives. In the 86th Congress,Senator Hayden proposed and the Senate adopted the same floor
amendment which had been agreed to by the Senate hi previousCongresses. The language of this amendment is as follows:
The provisions of this article shall not be construed to impair
any rights, benefits, or exemptions now or hereafter con-ferred by law upon persons of the female sex.
Past debates and hearings have shown disagreement among women's
organizations concerning the benefits which this amendment wouldbring to their sex. The desirability of equality is almost unanimously
conceded. The method of carrying such into effect has created the
areas of disagreement.
There remain many well-known vestiges of ancient rules of law
which treat women as inferiors. In many States, a woman cannothandle or own separate property in the same manner as her husband.
In some- States, she cannot engage in business or pursue a profession
or occupation as freely as can a member of the male sex. Women are
classified separately for purposes of jury service in many States.Community-property States do not vest in the wife the same degree
of property rights as her husband enjoys. The inheritance rights of
widows differ from those of widowers in some States. Restrictive work
laws, which purport to protect women by denying them a man'sfreedom to pursue employment, actually result n discrimination in
the employment of women by making it so burdensome upon employ-
ers. Such protective restrictions hinder women in their competition
with men for supervisory, technical, and professional job opportunities.
The subcommittee has considered carefully the amendment which
was added to this proposal on the floor of the Senate in the 81st, 83d,
and 86th Congresses. Its effect was to preserve "rights, benefits, or
exemptions" conferred by law upon persons of the female sex. Thisqualification is not acceptable to women who want equal rights underthe law. It is under the guise of so-called "rights" or "benefits" that
women have been treated unequally and denied opportunities which
are available to men.
Just as equal protection of the law under the 14th amendment is
not a mathematical equality, this amendment does not contemplatethat women must be treated in all respects the same as men. Nordoes it mean that all legal differentiation of the sexes will be abolished.
Equality does not mean sameness. Equal rights does not necessarily
mean identical-rights. For instance, a law granting maternity bene-fits to women would not be an unlawful discrimination against men.
As a grant to mothers, it would be based on a reasonable classificationdespite its limitation to members of one sex.
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Nor would the amendment mean that criminal laws governing sexual
offenses would become unconstitutional. The public has such an in-
terest in relations between the sexes that the conduct of both sexes is
subject to regulation under the police power apart from any considera-tions of unequal treatment or protective status.
In the past, it has been suggested that this amendment would require
equal treatment of men and women for purposes of compulsory mili-
tary service. This is no more true than that all men are treated
equally for purposes of military duty. Differences in physical abilities
among all persons would continue to be a material factor. It couldbe expected that women will be equally subject to military conscrip-
tion and they have demonstrated that they can perform admirably in
many capacities in the Armed Forces. But the Government would
not require that women serve where they are not fitted just as men
with physical defects are utilized in special capacities, if at all.
The subcommittee wishes to emphasize one additional fact. The
proposed amendment would confirm equal rights under law for both
men and women. In instances where laws are burdensome to men
solely because of their sex, they would benefit from the amendment.
For instance, alimony laws probably could not favor women solelybecause of their sex. However, a divorce decree could award support
to a mother if she was granted custody of children. This wouldbe incidental to the children's support. Matters concerning custody
and. support of children properly should be determined solely with
a view to the welfare of the children, without favoritism to either
parent solely because of sex.
Both major political parties have repeatedly supported this pro-
posal in their national party platforms.
The subcommittee has been in continuous study of the equal rights
amendments. Correspondence and interviews with the nationallyknown experts and exemplary organizations in this field have been
conducted throughout the session. All the preparatory work hasbeen done, and it is anticipated that the subcommittee will report outfavorably this resolution in the 2d session of the 88th Congress.
18-YEAR-OLD VOTING
Two proposals pending in the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments would lower the voting age to 18. They are Senate
Joint Resolution 2 (by Mr. Randolph) and Senate Joint Resolution 38(by Messrs. Keating and Kefauver).
Each resolution provides simply that the voting rights of citizens
of the United States who are 18 years of age or older shall not be denied
or abridged on account of age by the United States or by any State.
Thus, they would apply to all State and Federal elections.Similar resolutions were included in the hearings conducted by the
subcommittee during the 1st session of the 87th Congress.
STATEMENT
There is a difference of opinion on this question of lowering the
voting age by constitutional amendment both as to substance and form.
Some support the objective of lowering the voting age to 18, believ-ing that young people are as well qualified to vote at 18 as at 21.
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Some believe the question should be left with each individual State
to accomplish this result through local action rather than imposing it
on the entire Nation by amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Some feel that the age should remain at 21.
Some feel that the rising level of education in our country justified
uniform extension of the franchise to 18-year-olds.
The executive favors lowering the age to 18 which was evidencedby the late President's support for 18-year-old voting for the District
of Columbia. The executive, however, took the position that the
matter should be left for separate determination by each State.
The last time the Senate considered 18-year-old voting was in the83d Congress, when a proposed constitutional amendment was
approved by a vote of 34 to 24, five votes short of the required
two-thirds majority.
A test of current Senate sentiment may have occurred on Septem-ber 19, 1961, when the. Senate voted on the Presidential Elections
Code for the District of Columbia. The bill reported from the
District of Columbia Committee had set the voting age at 18. An
amendment establishing the voting age at 21 was agreed to by a vote
of 38 to 36.
The subcommittee decided not to act on the voting age resolutions
and instead decided to continue its staff studies. It is apparent that
there is no unanimity of agreement on this problem, nor at the
present time is there an unusual amount of interest throughout the
country.
REPEAL OF 22D AMENDMENT
Senate Joint Resolution 26, which was introduced by Messrs.
Kcfauver and Long of Missouri, proposes that the 22d amendment to
the Constitution be repealed. This would remove the two-termlimitation upon the President.
STATEMENT
In the 87th Congress the subcommittee considered a similar resolu-
tion (S.J. Res. 15) on August 3, 1961. The opinion was expressed
that there was not sufficient public interest to justify action at that
time. There is a definite feeling among most members of the sub-
committee that more experience should be gained with the operation
of the 22d amendment before its repeal is considered. In the 87th
Congress the subcommittee voted to recommend to the full Committee
on the Judiciary that this resolution (i.e., S.J. Res. 15 of the 87thCong.) be postponed indefinitely. The subcommittee's recommenda-
tion was adopted by the full committee on January 31, 1962.
The subcommittee decided not to take action on Senate Joint
Resolution 26 preferring to hold it in the committee pending additional
studies and correspondence with known constitutional authorities.
Rather, it is contemplated that the subcommittee staff digest the
existing voluminous materials and make a subcommittee report for
the future use of the committee and the Senate.
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I concur in the report but with this one additional observation.
As one who for many years had been deeply concerned with theproblem of Presidential inability, I had thought that at last we were
well on our way toward a workable and acceptable solution when on
June 25, 1963, this subcommittee unanimously reported favorably
to the full committee a proposed amendment (S.J. Res. 35) sponsoredby the late Senator Kefauver, Senator Dodd, and myself. At the
time of this writing, Senate Joint Resolution 35 is on the agenda of
the full committee and ripe for action.
It is an unquestionable fact that the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy cn November 22, 1963, generated both in and out
of Congress renev ed concern over Presidential inability. But the
events of that tragic day in American history certainly cannot be
said to have added any new dimensions to the underlying constitutional
problem which had not already been fully considered. For over 175
years before President Kennedy was assassinated, and in the few
months since, the original constitutional silences on Presidentialinability-the silences that spell a grave potential danger to the
stability and continuity of the American Presidency as an institution-have remained absolutely the same. President Kennedy's death,
therefore, did not give rise to the problem but only underlined itslong-recognized importance.
This elementary fact is stressed as but a caveat. The legal spade-
work has been done. A consensus has been reached-as of June of
last year, in fact. I very much regret that, rather than galvanizing
the Congress into completing action on Senate Joint Resolution 35,
President Kennedy's assassination apparently has triggered a surfeit
of proposals on inability which can only serve the purpose of furtherdelay and of trafficking with the danger of losing our past consensus
without replacing it with one that is demonstrably superior.
It is ever so much more important, in my judgment, to take actionin the field of inability than in respect to changing the line of Presi-dential succession or otherwise dealing with a vacancy in the Vice
Presidency. For the succession problem at least has been providedfor in the act of 1947, and although it is not in my view the best
solution that can be-devised, it is nevertheless unrealistic to suppose
that a change can be worked in the present session of the Congress.
The inability enigma, however, demands immediate attention, and
I think it would be most unfortunate if the further hearings on the
subject which are now in progress were to result in either protracteddelay or in dissipating the widespread agreement on Senate Joint
Resolution 35 that had previously been reached.
KENNETH B. KEATING.
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Proposed constitutional amendments introduced in Senate during Ist sess., 88th Cong.
[Tabulated by number and chronologically]
Hearings Reported
Resolution No. Sponsors Subject matter Date con- by sub-introduced ducted com-
mittee
SJ.Res. 1-----------------
S.J. Res. 2----------
SJ. Res.8-------------
S.J. Res. 12---------------
SJ. Res. 13---------------
SJ. Res. 16----------------
.J. Res. 24 ------ ----------
S.J. Res. 25----------
SJ. Res. 2-----------
SJ. Res. 27.-----------------
S.J. Res. 28----------
SJ. Res. 29.---------------
S.J. Res.35-----
o.SJ. Res. 36------------
S.3. Res. 37.---------.------
SJ. Res. 38-----------.-
Mrs. Smith.-----.--------
Mr. Randolph.-----------------------
Mr. McGee.-------------------------
Messrs. Mundt, Thurmond, McClellan, Hruska,
Morton, Fong, Boggs, Stennis, Prouty, and Gold-
water.
Mr. Smathers--..--.-------------
Messrs. Talmadge, Byrd of Virginia, Robertson,
Johnston, Hill, Sparkman, Eastland, Stennis,
Ellender, Long of Louisiana, and Simpson.
Mr. Kefauver ----------------------
--do ----------------------------------------
Messrs. Kefauver and Long of Missouri--.-----
Mr. Kefauver------ --------------- -------
--do..... ----------------------: -------------
Messrs. Curtis and Byrd of Virginia-------.----
Messrs. Kefauver and Keating-------------------
do......
-do .-----------------..--..-------
---do --.. -----------------------
Election of President and Vice President.-------
18-year-old voting --------------
Election of President and Vice President.-------
---do--.------------------.-------
Jan. 14,1963
---do.-----
--do----
--do.---
X---
X---
---.do
----------------------do---- X-State control of public schools----- ---------- Jan. 15, 1963 ------
Election of President and Vice President-------
Presidential and vice-presidential primary elections-
Repeal of 22d amendment ---------------
Election of President and Vice President-.-.-----.-
Presidential inability.-----------------..----
Balancing ofbudget_-----.---
Presidential inability-.- ------------.-
Emergency appointment of Representatives-----
Residence requirements for voting.-------------18-year-oldvoting.--------
- - ---- - - -
Jan. 23,1963o
----.do -----
---do-----
Feb. 5, 1963
--.do.---,
.....do---
---do .--
X---
X
.......
X
.......X------ix-------X-___
X.
X.1
X.2
X.2
X.2
See footnotes at end of table, p. 32.
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Proposed constitutional amendments introduced in Senate during 1st sess., 8Sth Cong.-Continued
[Tabulated by number and chronologically]
.
Hearings Reported
Resolution No. Sponsors Subject matter Date con- by subintroduced ducted com-
mittee
SJ. Res. 42---------------------- Mr. Thurmond -------------------- Establishment of Court of Union ---------- Feb. 14,1963 -----
S.. Res. 43- do - -------- Process of amending Constitution ----- ----------- do- -----
S.J. Res. 45----------------- Mr. McGee, Mrs. Smith, Messrs. Bayh, Beall, Equal rights for men and women------------ Feb. 18,1963 -----
Bible, Boggs, Brewster, Burdick, Cooper, Dodd,
Eastland, Engle, Fong, Fulbnght, Gruening,
Hartke, Hickenlooper, Humphrey, Inouye,Kubel, Long of Missouri, McCarthy, Miller,Moree, Moss,Mundt, Nelson, Randolph, Ribiooff,
Simpon, Smathers, Stennis, Talmadge, Tower,
Williams of Delaware, and Young of North
Dakota.
SJ. Res. 54 Mr. Tower......------------------------------ Balancing of budget--------------------------- Feb. 28,1963 ..--SJi Res. 62------------- - Mr. MetcalL- - ------ ------- 4-year term for House and S-year term for Senate--. Mar. 19,1963 ------
S.J. Res. 73 -------------------- Mr. Keating____-. --- Election of President and Vice President--------- Apr. 26,1963 X---
SJ. Res. 82 ----- ---------- Messrs. Williams of New Jersey, Humphrey, and Voting requirements for presidential, vice-presiden- May 16,1963 -----
Pell. tial, and congressional elections.
SJ. Res. 84 -------------M--essrs. Hruska and McClellan ------ -------- Presidential inability.------------Ma-----May 28,1963 X----
S.J. Res. 114 ------ -------- Messrs. Keating, Carlson Clark, Cooper, Javits, Item veto----------- -------------- Aug. 28,1963 -------Kucbel, Morton, Proimire, and Scott.
S.J. Res. 138----- - ----- Mr. Javits -------------.---_--- - -- Election of Vice President-------- ----------- Dec. 12,1963 -------
S.J. Res. 139---------------------- Messrs. Bayh, Bible, Burdick, Long of MAissouri, Presidential inability and succession to Presidency ---- do-------- -----
Moss, Pell, and Randolph. and Vice-Presidency.
S.J. Res. 140-------- Mr. Keating - ------------------------- Executive Vice President and legislative Vice Dec. 19, 1 ----President.
S.J. Res. 142------------------- Mr. PelL---------------------------------- Extension of franchise for District of Columbia- Dec. 20,1963
i Reported without recommendation.2 Reported favorably.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
[S. Res. 57, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
RESOLUTION
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly au-
thorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized under sections 134 (a)
and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended,
and in accordance with its jurisdictions specified by rule XXV of theStanding Rules of the Senate, to examine, investigate, and make a
complete study of any and all matters pertaining to constitutional
amendments.
SEC. 2. For the purposes of this resolution the committee, from
March 1, 1963, to January 31, 1964, inclusive, is authorized (1) to
make such expenditures as it deems advisable; (2) to employ upon a
temporary basis, technical, clerical, and other assistants and consul-
tants: Provided, That the minority is authorized to select one personfor appointment, and the person so selected shall be appointed and his
compensation shall be so fixed that his gross rate shall not be less by
more than $1,600 than the highest gross rate paid to any other em-ployee; and (3) with the prior consent of the heads of the departments
or agencies concerned, and the Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion, to utilize the reimbursable services, information, facilities, andpersonnel of any of the departments or agencies of the Government.SEC. 3. The committee shall report its activities and findings,
together with its recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable,
to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than
January 31, 1964.SEC. 4. Expenses of the-committee, under this resolution, which
shall not exceed $54,423, shall be paid from the contingent fund of theSenate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.
[Confidential Committee Print No. 2, July 13, 1963]
[S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of theUnited States relating to cases where the President is unable to dischargethe powers and duties of his office
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only if
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE -
"In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the Vice President. In
case of the inability of the President to discharge the powers andduties of the said office, the said powers and duties shall devolve onthe Vice President as Acting President until the inability be removed.The Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President,
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declaring what officer shall then be President, or in case of inability, act
as President, and such officer shall be or act as President accordingly,
until a President shall be elected or, in case of inability, until theinability shall be earlier removed. Te-e eomffmneemet*ntt4temia-reft4 tytftab4i-y htll eb deefin edby s+e e as.o ire.
saftl by tw provide.." Congress may prescribe by law the method by
which the commencement and termination of any inability shall bedetermined."
[S.J. lies. 36, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION To amend the Constitution to authorize Governors to fill
temporary vacancies in the House of Representatives
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution only if
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE -,
"SECTION 1. On any date that the total number of vacancies in theHouse of Representatives exceeds one-third of the authorized member-
ship thereof, and for a period of sixty days thereafter, the executive
authority of each State shall have power to make temporary appoint-
ments to fill any vacancies, including those happening during such
period, in the representation from his State in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Any person temporarily appointed to fill any such va-
cancy shall serve until the people fill the vacancy by election asprovided for by article I, section 2, of the Constitution.
"SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."
[S.J. Res. 37, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States relative to residence requirements for voting in presidential
elections
Resolved by the Senate and Htouse of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House con-
curring' therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as an
anlenl enollt to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratifiedby the leFislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years of the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE -
"SECTION 1. NoTcitizen of the United States who is otherwise quali-fied to vote in ally election held in any State or in the District con-
stituting the seat of Government of the United States for the purpose,in whole or in part, of choosing electors of President and Vice President
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shall be denied the right to vote for such electors in such election
because of any residence requirement of such State or such District,
as the case may be, if such citizen has resided in such State (or the
political subdivision thereof with respect to which the requirement
applies), or in such District, as the case may be, for a period of at
least ninety days preceding such election.
"SEC. 2. Any citizen of the United States who has been a resident
of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District con-
stituting the seat of the Government of the United States for a lesser
period than that required for voting in an. election for electors of
President and Vice President, and who is otherwise qualified to vote
in such election, shall nevertheless be entitled to vote in such election,if lie was either eligible to so vote in another political subdivision of
the same State, or in another State, or in such District, immediately
prior to his change of residence, or if he would have been eligible to
so vote if lie had continued to reside in such place until such election."
[S.J. Res. 12, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States providing for the election of the President and Vice President
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House con-
curring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States which shall be valid to all
intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by thelegislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven yearsfrom the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE-
"SECTION 1. Each State shall choose a number of electors of Presi-
dent and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress;but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust
or profit under the United States, shall be chosen an elector.
"The electors to which a State is entitled by virtue of its Senators
shall be elected by the people thereof, and the electors to which it is
entitled by virtue of its Representatives shall be elected by the people
within single-elector districts established by the legislature thereof;
such districts to be composed of compact and contiguous territory,
containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which
entitled the State to one Representative in the Congress; and suchdistricts when formed shall not be altered until another census has
been taken. Before being chosen elector, each candidate for the
office shall officially declare the persons for whom he will vote forPresident and Vice President, which declaration shall be binding on
any successor. In choosing electors of President and Vice Presidentthe voters in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature, except
that the legislature of any State may prescribe lesser qualifications
with respect to residence therein.
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"The electors shall meet in their respective States, fill any vacanciesin their number as directed by the State legislature, and vote by
signed ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least,
shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and indistinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President; and they shall
make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all
persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for
each, excluding therefrom any votes for persons other than those
named by an elector before he was chosen, unless one or both of the
persons so named be deceased, which lists they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the seat of government of the United States,directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; the personhaving the greatest number of votes for President shall be the Presi-dent, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors
chosen; and the person having the greatest number of votes for Vice
President shall be the Vice President, if such a number be a majority
of the whole number of electors chosen.
"If no person voted for as President has a majority of the whole
number of electors, then from the persons having the three highest
numbers on the lists of persons voted for as President, the Senate and
the House of Representatives, assembled and voting as individual
Members of one body, shall choose immediately, -by ballot, the
President; a quorum for such purpose shall be three-fourths of the
whole number of the Senators and Representatives, and a majority
of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice; if additionalballots be necessary, the choice on the fifth ballot shall be between
the two persons having the highest number of votes on the fourthballot.
"If no person-voted for as Vice President has a majority of the whole
number of electors, then the Vice President shall be chosen from the
persons having the three highest numbers on the lists of persons
voted for as Vice President in the same manner as herein providedfor choosing the President. But no person constitutionally ineligible
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of
the United States.
"SEc. 2. The Congress may by law provide for the case of thedeath of any of the persons from whom the Senate and the House of
Representatives may choose a President or a Vice President whenever
the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.
"SEC. 3. This article supersedes the second and fourth paragraphs
of section 1, article II, of the Constitution, the twelfth article of
amendment to the Constitution and section 4 of the twentieth article
of amendment to the Constitution. Except as herein expressly pro-
vided, this article does not supersede the twenty-third article of
amendment.
"SEC. 4. Electors appointed pursuant to the twenty-third-article of
amendment to this Constitution shall be elected by the people of
such district in such manner as the Congress may direct. Beforebeing chosen as such elector, each candidate shall officially declarethe persons for whom he will vote for President and Vice President,
which declaration shall be binding on any successor. Such electors
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shall meet in the district and perform the duties provided in section
1 of this article.
"SEC. 5. This article shall take effect on the 1st day of July followingits ratification."
[S.J. Res. 27, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States providing for the election of President and Vice President
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House con-
curring therein), That an amendment is hereby proposed to the
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents
and purposes as part of the Constitution only if ratified by three-fourths of the legislatures of the several States within seven yearsfrom the date of its submission by the-Congress:
"ARTICLE -
"SECTION 1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the
term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for
the same term, be elected as provided in this Constitution.
"The office of elector of the President and Vice President, as estab-lished by section 1 of article II and the twelfth article of amendment
to this Constitution, is hereby abolished. The President and Vice
President shall be elected by the people of the several States and the
District constituting the seat of government of the United States.
The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature except
that the legislature of any State may prescribe: lesser qualifications
with respect to residence therein. The electors in the District shallhave such qualifications as the Congress may prescribe. The places
and manner of holding such election in each State shall be prescribedby the legislature thereof. The place and manner of holding such
election in the District shall be prescribed by the Congress. Congress
shall determine the time of such election, which shall be the same
throughout the United States. Until otherwise determined by theCongress, such election shall be held on the Tuesday next after thefirst Monday in November of the year preceding the year in whichthe regular term of the President is to begin. Each State shall be
entitled to a number of electoral votes equal to the whole number ofSenators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in
the Congress. The District shall be entitled to a number of electoral
votes equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives inCongress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State,but in no event more than the least populous State.
"Within forty-five days after such election, or at such time asCongress shall direct, the official custodian of the election returns of
each-State and the District shall make distinct lists of all persons for
whom votes were cast for President and the number of votes for each
and the total vote of the electors of the State or the District for all
persons for President, which lists he shall sign and certify and transmit
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sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to
the President of the Senate. On the 6th day of January following the
election, unless the Congress by law appoints a different day not
earlier than the 4th day of January and not later than the 10th day of
January, the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all certificates and the
votes shall than be counted. Each person for whom votes were cast
for President in each State and the District shall be credited with such
proportion of the electoral votes thereof as he received of the total
vote of the electors therein for President. In making the computation,fractional numbers less than one one-thousandth shall be disregarded.
The person having the greatest number of electoral votes for President
shall be President, if such number be at least 40 per centum of the
whole number of such electoral votes. If no person has at least 40 per
centum of the whole number of electoral votes, then from the personshaving the two highest numbers of electoral votes for President the
Senate and the House of Representatives sitting in joint session shall
choose immediately, by ballot, the President. A majority of the votes
of the combined authorized membership of the Senate and the House
of Representatives shall be necessary for a choice.
"The Vice President shall be likewise elected, at the same time andin the same manner and subject to the same provisions, as the Presi-dent, but no person constitutionally ineligible for the office of President
shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.
"The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any
of the persons from whom the Senate and the House of Representatives
may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall be havedevolved upon them, and for the case of death of any of the personsfrom whom the Senate and the House of Representatives may choose
a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved
upon them.
"SEC. 2. This article shall take effect on the 10th day of February
next after one year shall have elapsed following its ratification."
[S.J. Res. 45, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States relative to equal rights for men and women
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States oj America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each Houce
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
"ARTICLE -
"SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress and the several States shall have power, within their respec-
tive jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States.
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"SEC. 3. This amendment shall take effect one year after the date
of ratification."
[S. J. Res. 2, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, extending the right to vote to citizens eighteen years of age or
older
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
"ARTICLE -
"SETrIoN 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridgedby the United States or by any State on account of age. The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date ofits submission to the States by the Congress."
[S.J. Res. 38, 88th Cong., 1st seas.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States granting to citizens of the United States who have attained the
age of eighteen the right to vote.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House
concurring therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shallbe valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution onlyif ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE -
"The right of citizens of the United States, who have reached the
age of eighteen years, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by theUnited States or by any State on account of age. The Congress shallhave power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
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[S.J. Res. 26, 88th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to repealthe twenty-second article of amendment to the Constitution
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House con-
curring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid as part
of the Constitution only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States within seven years from the date of its submissionby the Congress:
"ARTICLE-
"SECTION 1. The twenty-second article of amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States is hereby repealed.
"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the States within seven years from the date of its
submission to the States by the Congress."
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